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War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

IS BALANCE OF POWER RELEVANT IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL POLITICS?
Paul, E. V., James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st
Century. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004. 384pp. $27.95

Although this book features a number
of excellent essays, it is hard to understand why it was ever written. One
would have profited more from rereading Ernst Haas’s brilliant 1953 essay on
the topic (“The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda,”
World Politics 5, no. 4 [July 1953], pp.
442–77).
In his introductory essay, E. V. Paul
poses several theoretical and empirical
questions about the balance of power.
However, the real issue is whether the
concept is relevant in contemporary
global politics. Frankly, I did not think
that anyone (except, perhaps, John
Mearsheimer) seriously believed that
balance of power exhibits anything
much about the real world.
Happily, the contributors to this volume reach a similar conclusion. Jack
Levy sets the tone with a rigorous and
well reasoned historical analysis. He
concludes that “the tendency to treat
the theory . . . as universal is misleading,” because of the limited “scope
conditions” in which the theory was
applied. Douglas Lemke focuses on the
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utility of balance of power as defined by
Mearsheimer’s version of “offensive realism” and determines that the concept
is so “vaguely stated” that he finds it
“impossible to imagine a scenario that
would be inconsistent” with it. In his
imaginative effort to add an economic
dimension to balance-of-power theory,
Mark Brawley suggests that it “is typically too parsimonious to be of great
use,” and James Wirtz concludes that
the theory cannot predict outcomes in
the post–Cold War world. Edward
Rhodes continues to flog this dead
horse, concluding that “liberalism and
nuclear weapons mean that states will
not seek to balance power.”
The regional analyses change little.
Europeans, Robert Art concludes, want
more influence on U.S. policy but are
not doing much about it; balanceof-power theory, declares William
Wohlforth, “does not apply” to Russia
or its neighbors; Benjamin Miller can
find “no countervailing coalition . . .
against U.S. hegemony” in the Middle
East; and, according to Michael Barletta
and Harold Trinkunas, there is no
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“evidence of balance of power behavior
in Latin America in the post–Cold War
period.” Get the point?
The editors try to salvage something
from this muddle by some fanciful ad
hoc theorizing, in particular pressing us
to accept the notion of “soft balancing,”
which basically translates into arguing
that almost any opposition to a country’s policies or actions constitutes balancing behavior. The most vigorous
effort to salvage balance-of-power theory
from history’s dustbin is Christopher
Layne’s unapologetic realism, which,
while finding little empirical evidence
for balancing, nevertheless boldly predicts that it is “a pretty safe bet” that
the United States “will not be able to escape the fates of previous contenders
for hegemony.” This is a bet based on
faith, not fact. The other believer is
Robert Ross, who contends that “balance of power politics has been especially pronounced in East Asia.” What
is extraordinary about Ross’s essay is
that it ignores the implications of
China’s economic growth, its integration into the world economic system,
and its escalating interdependence with
those against whom it is presumably
balancing.
Overall, this is a book of missed opportunities. Perhaps the most important is
its failure to come to grips with the subjective dimension of global politics. Authors repeatedly and positively invoke
Stephen Walt’s modification of balanceof-power theory with the addition of
threat perception but fail to recognize
its importance in directing our attention to the centrality of ideas and perceptions. There are hints, however, as
when Lemke discusses the key role of
the “distribution of attitudes” and
Wirtz alludes to “divergence in
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perception.” Only Rhodes captures the
critical role played by the social construction and reconstruction of ideas in
the declining relevance of balance of
power. In an essay that deserves greater
attention than it will receive in this volume, Rhodes succinctly captures the
degree to which balance of power has
been made obsolete by the disappearance of trinitarian warfare. In the end,
we conclude with him that it “is simply
ludicrous” to assume that “every state
lives in fear of the imperial ambitions of
every other state in the present age.”
RICHARD MANSBACH

Department of Political Science
Iowa State University

Haldi, Stacy Bergstrom. Why Wars Widen: A Theory of Predation and Balancing. London: Frank
Cass, 2003. 198pp. $114.95

Why Wars Widen is a theoretical and
empirical analysis of why neutral states
choose to enter an ongoing great-power
war. Most international-relations scholarship neglects this question, choosing
instead to explain the origins of war.
Haldi, of both the Naval War College
and Gettysburg College, opens her book
with the observation that states entering
an ongoing conflict “may have interests
and policies entirely distinct from those
of the initial combatants.” The book
seeks to reveal these interests. Chapters
1 and 2 introduce the argument that
neutrals are most likely to widen greatpower wars in eras of low political cost,
when war is limited and less threatening to state survival. Moreover, when
political cost is low, widening a war is
likely to occur for predatory reasons or
to acquire strategic assets that will
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enhance national power. In contrast,
neutrals are less likely to widen wars
when the political cost of war is high. In
these eras, when wars threaten a state’s
survival, neutrals will tend to use ongoing wars to balance against an adverse
shift in the distribution of power, but
only after all other balancing options
have been exhausted. The remaining
chapters test this argument against alternative explanations, alliances and offense dominance, and offer predictions
for the likelihood of war widening in
the contemporary international system.
Haldi’s study encompasses great-power
wars between 1700 and 1973, with a focus on the Seven Years’ War, the French
Revolutionary War, the Napoleonic
Wars, the Crimean War, and World
War I. Additional cases of great-power
wars susceptible to widening are included in an appendix. Prior to the Napoleonic Wars, the political cost of war
was low, Haldi argues, because armies
were costly to maintain and soldiers
were not expendable. Thus predatorywar widening became more frequent in
this era. However, political and social
changes that occurred alongside the
French Revolutionary War and the Napoleonic Wars reduced these costs, allowing France to introduce an era of
unlimited wars that sought the enemy’s
total destruction. From that point forward, Haldi maintains, the political cost
of war was high and balancing-war widening tended to be more prevalent. Perhaps the greatest strength of this
analysis is that each case study examines the motivations of states that entered ongoing wars, as well as those that
could have but did not. The author
concludes that the war-widening theory
explains each incidence of widening
much better than the competing
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theories can and may even lend insight
into the likelihood of contemporary
war widening.
The greatest appeal of this work is its
attempt to delve into the largely neglected area of international-relations
theory. However, it suffers from two serious flaws. First, it attempts to cover a
lot of material succinctly, resulting in
insufficiently explained references to
history and theory, including the concept of great-power war, which is central to the author’s argument. A deeper
analysis of the alternative theories of
alliances and offense dominance would
also have been more satisfying. This
deficiency makes the work most appropriate for graduate students and researchers already familiar with the
terrain. The subject matter is interesting, but the author could have attracted
a broader audience if she had analyzed
her work in greater depth. Second, the
contemporary relevance of Haldi’s policy implications is unconvincing. Her
conclusions drawn from European
great-power wars are not clearly applicable to the contemporary international
system, simply because the threat of
such wars, let alone war widening, is
negligible. Moreover, because future
occurrences of great-power war widening will probably include at least one
nuclear power, nuclear weapons should
definitely be considered more systematically if Haldi’s predictions are to carry
any weight. These concerns might have
possibly been overcome by including an
analysis of the Korean or Vietnam
wars—two cases found in the appendix—
or perhaps an even more contemporary
conflict like the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
Despite these limitations, serious students of interstate warfare will find this
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work a useful entry into the question of
why wars widen.
KIRSTEN RAFFERTY

Department of Government and International
Studies
Berry College

Roberts, Paul. The End of Oil: On the Edge of a
Perilous New World. New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 2004. 386pp. $26

By 2025 world energy demand is expected to increase by 54 percent. Oil
and natural gas consumption is expected to increase 57 and 68 percent,
respectively, by then. Total energy consumption in 2025 for China, India, and
South Korea is predicted to equal that
of the United States. What do these figures really tell us about today’s energy
economy? The answers can be found in
The End of Oil, in which Paul Roberts
superbly navigates the complex topic of
energy and explains how energy has
become the currency of political and
economic power. Roberts’s argument
centers on three key points: “that energy is the single most important resource, that our current energy
economy is failing, and that the shape
of the next energy economy is being decided right now—with or without our
input.” The author’s hope is that The
End of Oil will provide nonexperts with
a way to begin to think about energy.
The End of Oil is broken down into
three parts. Part 1 explains how and
why energy has become central to human existence. Part 2 examines the
mechanics of the energy order. This
section contains excellent discussions
on consumption, the current
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transformation of the oil and natural
gas industries, alternate fuels, and conservation. Part 3 looks at the promise
and peril of the world’s energy future; it
includes a valuable discussion on energy security. Roberts concludes with a
look at how the world could transition
to a new energy economy based on current trends.
Several important implications emerge
from Roberts’s analysis. First, the current energy system is failing to keep up
with current demand. As the developing world tries to catch up with the developed world, the demand for energy
will continue to increase regardless of
what happens with population and energy technology. In the future, the issue
may not be whether the world is producing the right type of energy but
whether it can produce enough. Second, there may be real limits to our
ability to produce ever-increasing volumes of energy. If this is true, then we
will need to radically rethink how we
consume and produce energy. Third,
the sooner we start to transform the
current energy economy, the more time
there will be to assess options and technologies. Fourth, the world cannot politically or economically shift from a
hydrocarbon-based energy economy to
a new energy economy overnight. During the transition, the world will need
to develop a transition, or “bridge,” energy economy. A bridge economy will
give markets and society the flexibility
and opportunity to phase out the worst
of current trends while creating a new
energy system. According to Roberts,
such an economy will likely require significant improvements in energy efficiency, and an increased reliance on
natural gas. Fifth, America’s energy

4

War College: Book Reviews
BOOK REVIEWS

policy can no longer afford to focus
solely on defending the supply of oil. As
time goes by, less oil will remain outside OPEC countries; proportionally
more will be in areas where its extraction is more difficult and costly. Over
time, this trend will make access problematic and uncertain. Lastly, energy is
political. Because energy is centrally
connected to everything else of importance, overhauling the current system
is going to be one of the most politically difficult challenges facing the
world in the twenty-first century. This
process will entail considerable political
and economic risk.
Overall, Roberts’s coverage is balanced,
providing significant insights into all
aspects of the energy economy. One of
the strengths of The End of Oil is that it
offers the big picture without bogging
down the reader in endless technical
details or facts. Another of its strengths
is that although the author is somewhat
pessimistic about the world’s ability to
transition effectively and peacefully to
the next energy economy, he is able to be
optimistic as well.
In summary, The End of Oil is an effective argument for the need to take a
proactive role in building America’s energy future. We can either construct the
kind of energy future we desire or wait
and hope that the transition to the next
energy economy will work out on its
own. Hope, as any good strategist will
tell you, is not a strategy. The End of Oil
is therefore a must read for strategists,
political and business leaders, and anyone interested in America’s future.
ALAN BOYER

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
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Fukuyama, Francis. State Building: Governance
and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2004. 132pp. $21

This is an important policy analysis.
Francis Fukuyama, an expert on political and economic development, has
served on the State Department’s policy
planning staff and is now professor of
international political economy at
Johns Hopkins University.
In his book State Building, Fukuyama
argues here that the international community must do a better job of “statebuilding . . . because weak or failed
states are the sources of many of the
world’s most serious problems.” We
know a lot about public administration,
he says, but much less about how to
“transfer strong institutions to developing countries.”
Fukuyama coins the term “stateness,”
referring to a regime’s ability to perform. He distinguishes two dimensions
of stateness: state strength, which denotes that a government can “enforce
laws cleanly and transparently,” and
state scope, which embraces the range of
the functions that a government tries to
accomplish.
To understand what Fukuyama means
by scope, imagine a government that
seeks only to maintain public order, enforce contracts, provide national defense, and manage its money supply.
Fukuyama would describe that state as
having modest scope. Next, imagine a
government that, in addition to what
was just mentioned, owns and runs
steel mills and hospitals, tries to provide free education through the university level, and promises its people
pensions. Such a government would
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have considerable scope. However,
whether it could carry out any or all of
these functions well is an entirely separate matter of state strength.
What do poor countries need to develop economically? According to
Fukuyama, “conventional wisdom’s”
answer to this question has changed in
recent years. During the Ronald Reagan
and the Margaret Thatcher years, development experts focused on state scope,
arguing that less-developed countries
(LDCs) needed smaller governments;
accordingly, they urged states to discontinue activities that other parties
could handle better. Unfortunately,
they did not recognize the importance
of institutions like courts that work and
legal regimes that defend property
rights. As a result, international bodies
like the World Bank demanded that
states get smaller without distinguishing between scope (which should have
been reduced) and strength (which
should have been enhanced).
Fukuyama lists the causes for LDC state
weakness. Sometimes local elites benefit
from the status quo, which in many instances is, for them, a life-or-death issue. In other cases, society may not
understand how much better off it
would be given better institutions—
foreign donors’ efforts to develop
stronger state institutions via “conditionality” often fail. (Donors find it
hard to show “tough love” by cutting
off states that fail to meet their conditions. Even if one does so, moreover,
often another steps in.) In addition, donors often give higher priority to firstrate service delivery than to building
the capacity of the LDC’s fledgling
state bureaucracy. So they hire away
the best locals, often leaving the LDC
even weaker.
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The book examines the “international
dimension of state weakness,” stating
that instability is in fact driven by state
weakness. Since the Berlin Wall came
down, the author notes, most international crises have had to do with weak
or failing states. Sovereignty has been
eroded because of this weakness. No
one, says Fukuyama, in the international community believes in a “pure”
sovereignty any more. The humanitarian interventions of the 1990s eroded
what force that idea may once have had.
What should national security professionals learn from Fukuyama’s argument?
Here are three lessons. First, do not assume that postwar stabilization operations always involve state building. For
example, some people have expressed optimism about U.S. chances for making
Iraq and Afghanistan into democracies,
on grounds that the United States defeated tyrannical regimes in Germany and
Japan and successfully made democracies
of them. Fukuyama points out that those
latter occupations did not involve state
building. Germany and Japan were hard
to beat because they were already strong
states. U.S. victory and occupation
changed those states’ bases of legitimacy;
doing so was easier than creating a strong
state from a weak one. Second, the United
States should have modest expectations
for building democratic states and growing economies in countries with weak
states. The United States has “intervened
and/or acted as an occupation authority
. . . [and] . . . pursued . . . nation-building
activities in . . . Cuba, the Philippines,
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico,
Panama, Nicaragua, South Korea, and
South Vietnam.” Despite U.S. efforts,
“South Korea was the only country to
achieve long-term economic growth.”
Third, given America’s poor track record
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at creating strong states via occupation, it
should be thinking about fall-back positions if it fails at creating democracy
overseas.
The United States needs to get better at
state building. The U.S. military cannot
avoid bearing much of the implied burden, like it or not. Read State Building
for a thoughtful introduction to the
challenges involved.
MARSHALL HOYLER

Naval War College

Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the
CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin, 2004. 695pp. $29.95

The events of 9/11 led many in the
United States to wonder what had actually led up to that fateful day. Who was
to blame? How could the United States,
with its multibillion-dollar intelligence
and defense budgets, have allowed such
a thing to happen? In Ghost Wars, Steve
Coll provides a useful, if overly long,
chronology and analysis of pivotal
events, missteps, indecision, apathy,
and ultimately tragedy up to the day before the attacks.
Coll, who served as the managing editor
for the Washington Post until 2004, was
the paper’s South Asia bureau chief
from 1989 to 1992. He won a Pulitzer
Prize in 1990 for his reporting on South
Asia, and he has been a keen observer of
events in the region. He begins his story
with the burning of the U.S. embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 1979
and traces the long road of events to 11
September. It was shortly after the riots
in Islamabad that the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, in December 1979.
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As he weaves his narrative, Coll meticulously documents every player and
agenda in this drama. Coll divides the
book into three parts. In the first he
discusses the Soviet occupation from
December 1979 to February 1989. It is
here that we are introduced to mujahedeen leaders Ahmed Shah Massoud,
Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
and Osama Bin Laden. One also becomes acquainted with key players in
the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI-D) and in the Saudi
monarchy who played key roles in
bankrolling the resistance. The author
also provides valuable insights into the
U.S. policy-making process. During this
period, the United States was consumed
with battling the Soviet occupation, and
most policy makers did not give serious
thought to the repercussions of the
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate’s
growing control over aid distribution or
the increasing anti-American attitudes of
such rebel commanders as Hekmatyar.
Coll continues to trace events in Afghanistan after the Soviet pullout in
1989. Once the Soviets were gone, interest in a stable Afghanistan rapidly
waned as other crises in the immediate
post–Cold War era monopolized U.S.
attention. As a result, Afghanistan fell
into chaos as warlords fought each other
for control of Kabul. The lack of American involvement after the Soviets withdrew left Pakistan as the primary force to
manage the post-Soviet environment.
The author captures the rivalries within
Afghanistan, the manipulation of events
by the Pakistani government, and the
apathy of U.S. policy makers throughout
this period.
One of the major strengths of Ghost
Wars is how it skillfully captures the interagency debates within the U.S.
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government on Afghanistan—specifically, the discussion on various debates
among the CIA, the State Department,
and the National Security Council—
which were wide-ranging and often
contentious. After reading these accounts one is left with the distinct
impression that there was no overarching policy or strategy to attack
al-Qa‘ida. Instead, U.S. government
policy comes across as ad hoc, driven
by current contingencies or spurious
information about Osama Bin Laden’s
whereabouts.
In the final section, Coll documents the
often frantic and uncoordinated interagency campaign to find Bin Laden.
Despite George Tenet’s declaration in
December 1998 that the CIA was at war
with al-Qa‘ida, the U.S. government as
a whole never fully came to grips with
the threat posed by terrorism. For many
in Washington, terrorism represented
only one threat among many facing the
United States in the post–Cold War era.
Although terrorism did elicit concern
among top U.S. policy makers, it rarely
moved into a sustained, interagency
strategy to combat the threat.
Prospective readers of this book should
be aware that it is lengthy and requires
close attention. Characters and events
discussed in part 1 are revisited. Coll
helps the reader along with a list of
principal characters at the front of the
book. Despite its length, however,
Ghost Wars will provide valuable insights for anyone working within the
interagency process, as well as scholars
and regional observers interested in
how the United States got Afghanistan
and Bin Laden so tragically wrong.
AMER LATIF

Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Dahlgren, Virginia
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Maurer, John H., ed. Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas before the World Wars: Essays in Honor
of Michael I. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
164pp. $79.95

One of three volumes of essays (two focus on different aspects of strategy) published in Handel’s memory, this work is
based on a conference held in Newport,
Rhode Island. It offers four scholarly papers on Churchill’s assessment of the
German naval challenge before the First
World War, Pacific security and the limits of British power between the wars,
Churchill and the German threat in the
late 1930s, and Churchill’s views of technology. Each assesses a different aspect
of Churchill’s changing role.
Editor Maurer focuses on the early
1900s’ battleship naval race with Germany. Brought in as First Lord of the
Admiralty after the Agadir crisis of
1911, Winston Churchill is seen here as
fully aware of the danger to Britain if its
fleet were to be seriously disabled. The
Admiralty tried to maintain at least a 60
percent advantage in dreadnought construction against Germany. Churchill
sought to impress the Germans with the
futility of trying to catch up with, let
alone outbuild, Britain. Cognizant of
the costs of this race, however, in 1913
he proposed a naval “holiday” to
stretch out the construction of projected new ships over more time, hoping to reduce the pace. Maurer reviews
the important domestic political battles
that underlay this naval arms race.
Christopher Bell, who teaches history at
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, assesses Churchill’s concern
over the growing threat posed by Japan
in the interwar years. He notes a 1928
Churchill comment that “of all the wars
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in the world, [war with Japan] was the
least likely to happen.” After all, the two
countries shared an alliance that dated
to the beginning of the century. Extension of the “ten-year rule,” first promulgated in 1919, saw war in the Far
East as highly unlikely for at least another decade. As Bell makes clear, this
rule underlay a compromise between
the Treasury, concerned about costs,
and the Admiralty, which sought completion of its Singapore naval base and
more ships. By the mid-1930s, an outof-office Churchill began to change his
position, now expressing (as were
Whitehall ministries) growing concern
about Japan’s intentions. However, his
greater worry about a rearming Germany dominated naval needs in the Far
East. Even in 1939 he argued the unlikelihood of a Japanese attack on faroff Singapore, just as he (and others)
felt naval power alone could hold off
aggression. Events, of course, proved
this to be wishful thinking.
B. J. C. McKercher, the sole revisionist
here, teaches history at the Royal Military
College of Canada. He sees Churchill’s
famous speeches against Hitler’s Germany in the late 1930s as revealing a
politician on the make: “Quite simply,
he sought the premiership above all
else; thus, his criticisms of British foreign and defense policy were less selfless
than either he or his disciples later
claimed.” McKercher’s arguments help
balance excessive praise (years later) of
Churchill’s stance in this period. He
strongly defends prime ministers Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain as
working to rebuild British defenses just
as Churchill was attacking their seeming inaction. Munich is seen here—as
by other revisionists—as a vital play for
time to allow rearmament to reach full

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

149

effect. Churchill’s years in the political
wilderness “resulted from his own follies, primarily his antipathy to Baldwin
and Chamberlain,” during which, he
argues, “Churchill consistently exaggerated threats.”
David Jablonsky teaches at the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and
makes clear Churchill’s fascination with
what technology offered to overcome potential enemies. There are a host of interesting Churchill quotes on the impact
(sometimes literally) of newly developed
dum-dum bullets, improved pistols, and
later the tank and the airplane. At the same
time, Churchill was often concerned
about possible unintended effects of technological choice, as well as the ethics of
applying certain approaches. As the author notes, “The basic problem, Churchill
came to realize, was that technology had
changed the scale of warfare.” Before and
during the war, he was fascinated with
technical options, not all of them workable. Those that did work—such as signals intelligence—made a huge difference
in the outcome.
This is a very useful collection, carefully
researched and written, adding insight
to what we know of Churchill’s varied
diplomatic and military roles in a world
that moved from cavalry charges to hydrogen bombs. Michael Handel would
surely be pleased.
CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING

George Washington University

Mullis, Tony R. Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army
Operations in Bleeding Kansas. Columbia: Univ.
of Missouri, 2004. 273pp. $40.50

Tony Mullis, a serving officer in the
U.S. Air Force, takes a close look at a
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time when approximately 10 percent of
the U.S. Army was intimately involved
in one of the most challenging and politically charged assignments ever given
to the U.S. military. Assigned occupation duties in a land where tribal loyalties had been the primary form of
government, Army officers, in cooperation with diplomats appointed by the
president, were tasked to assist a fledgling democracy attain statehood while
avoiding incipient civil war. The task
was complicated by the infusion of
ideologically motivated outsiders, most
of them heavily armed. The two main
local factions committed a variety of
atrocities, including the massacre of
innocent civilians. Elections, new to the
area, were viewed with open suspicion
by most of the population. Local militias were often little more than muscle
for political leaders. Many of the thornier underlying political issues had religious and economic overtones. Several
Army officers assigned to these duties
were involved in scandals, and at least
one associated court-martial received
national attention. Meanwhile, powerful individuals in Washington disagreed, sometimes publicly, over
tactics, strategy, and policy in the affected region. To make matters worse,
ingrained organizational barriers and
an inherent resistance to change prevented promising new technologies
from being used with maximum effectiveness. Finally, while the Army may
have portrayed its role as one of neutral
professionalism, both Democrats and
Republicans were using the results of
the occupation as a key component of
their respective strategies for the next
presidential election. The year was
1854, and the theater of operations was
the Kansas Territory.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/10

Peacekeeping on the Plains clearly began
life as a doctoral dissertation. In its introduction Mullis lays out his basic
premise. Debunking the perhaps popular conception that the United States
has but recently come to experience
peace operations, Mullis shows that the
U.S. Army has been involved in missions of this type since the first days of
the Republic—though this historical involvement has long been overlooked
and underanalyzed. Mullis seeks to begin correcting this omission by examining in some detail the 1855 punitive
expedition against the Lakota (of the
Great Sioux Nation) as an example of
the Army’s efforts to keep peace in
“Bleeding Kansas.” Chapter 1 gives an
overview of the U.S. Army’s involvement in peace operations, and chapter 2
provides background information on
the issue of slavery and the creation of
the state of Kansas. Chapters 3 and 4
take a detailed look at the 1855 punitive
expedition led by General William S.
Harney. Chapters 5 through 8 deal with
Army operations supporting civil actions
in Kansas from 1854 to 1857. A conclusion and epilogue complete the work.
As was often demonstrated during the
1990s, the line between peace enforcement and war is often difficult to determine. This was no less true in 1855. The
U.S. Army used deadly force against the
Lakota, took hostages, and committed
various acts that would, by the standards of today, be judged illegal. Yet, as
Mullis points out, these operations were
carried out with a political objective in
mind, and, in the main, they were effective. Furthermore, Harney’s success
did have a positive impact, in that they
influenced other tribes to remain
peaceful. Such results would seem to
have contemporary parallels with peace
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operations conducted by the French in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the British in Sierra Leone, and the U.S.
Marines in Liberia.
The parallels between current operations in Iraq and those of the Army in
bleeding Kansas are even more strongly
apparent. Faced with a unique and unwelcome mission, the Army faced a
steep learning curve. There were missed
opportunities and at least several instances of officers engaging in dubious
ethical behavior in order to take advantage of perceived business opportunities. The initially appointed political
leadership proved too vacillating and
incompetent to deal with the complex
difficulties inherent in the situation.
Furthermore, the entire issue was a
red-hot political football, which the
newly created Republican Party was using to excoriate the incumbent
Democrats.
Like those against the Lakota, the peace
operations in Kansas were eventually
successful. Nationalizing factional militias, deploying federal forces to prevent
civil strife, and arresting infiltrating
partisans all contributed to political stability and a safe election environment.
Yet, as Mullis points out, several facets
of policy either failed or were badly
flawed. These included the failure to
utilize the telegraph to transmit information rapidly to and from the area of
operations. Mail was simply too slow to
be operationally relevant—the telegraph could have been a powerful tool
in the hands of the administration.
Peacekeeping on the Plains helps fill a gap
in the coverage of some of the formative
experiences of the U.S. Army. This is
valuable in and of itself. However, the
more immediate contribution of the
work is to identify lessons learned in the
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mid-1800s that may be applicable in the
early years of the twenty-first century.
However, as one would expect given the
immense technological differences between the eras, these lessons are rather
general in nature.
For example, it proved impossible to
craft orders so detailed as to cover every
situation the occupying forces encountered. Until local authorities began exercising authority they technically did
not possess, the result was a paralysis of
action. In connection with the Lakota
reprisal, Mullis also makes a convincing
argument for assigning older and presumably more mature officers to positions that would in these operations,
under normal circumstances, go to
younger officers.
Mullis’s work also shows that the central conundrum of peace operations
was as valid in the mid-nineteenth century as it is today. Enough troops with
the right leadership can impose a peace,
and might even be able to enforce a
peace, but unless the root causes of
conflict are resolved the peace has to be
pinned into place by bayonets and will
not endure. The peace imposed on the
Lakota by the U.S. Army did not last
long; it took a civil war and the destruction of the Confederacy to deal with the
root causes that led to bleeding Kansas.
As mentioned earlier, this work is
clearly derived from a dissertation, and
for that reason, while it is intellectually
stimulating, at times the writing is
somewhat ponderous, repetitive, and
dry. Yet the contribution this work
makes to understanding both past and
present eras of significance makes the
effort worthwhile.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College
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principal instrument whereby God works
these good things to thee.”
Herman, Arthur. To Rule the Waves: How the
British Navy Shaped the World. New York:
HarperCollins, 2004. 648pp. $26.95

The subtitle of Arthur Herman’s grand
maritime history To Rule the Waves
gives it all away: How the British Navy
Shaped the World. Through a series of
well-described episodes, Herman convincingly discusses how the Royal Navy
came to dominate the seas and sustained Britain’s ability to expand and
maintain its empire.
From John Hawkins and Francis Drake
to the amazingly named Cloudsley
Shovell, as well as Horatio Nelson, John
Fisher, David Beatty, and the like,
Herman traces the development of
men, ships, and strategies, and the technologies that forced change.
The initial impulse for trade was
matched by a desire for plunder, so that
the relationship that later developed between the navy and the merchant trade
required maturation. John Dee, writing
a memorial to Queen Elizabeth in 1577,
proposed a permanent navy as the
“master key wherewith to open all locks
that keep out or hinder this incomparable British empire.” Although the queen
lacked the means, the idea never really
died. John Holland, not quoted by
Herman, wrote in his 1638 “Discourse
of the Navy”: “If either the honour of a
nation, commerce, or trade with all nations, peace at home, grounded upon
our enemies’ fear or love of us abroad,
and attended with plenty of all things
necessary either for the preservation for
the public need, or thy private welfare,
be things worthy thy esteem . . . then
next to God and the King, give thy
thanks for the same to the navy, as the
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And nothing has changed.
This is a good book that describes all
the twists and turns necessary for a nation to become a great commercial
power and to protect itself from substantial competition and extraordinary
technological challenges. What Herman
establishes clearly is that ultimately it
was the will to develop a navy and the
willingness to use it in the most courageous manner, whether as a matter
of policy or as a commander’s individual initiative, that effectively supported the realm.
Unfortunately, Herman is not as well
supported by his publisher. There are
numerous editorial lapses in grammar
and proofreading, and although substantive factual errors are few, there are
enough to be annoying. For example,
the assertion that the average Britisher
consumed four pounds of sugar a day
in 1700 and twelve pounds a day in
1720 should actually read “per year.”
Saint Michel should read Saint Mihiel.
It is Saint Nazaire, not Nizaire, and
Veinticinco, not Veinticino. There is
also the omission of Port Stanley as a
principal town in the Falklands, and the
incorrect statement that “from [Prince]
Alfred on, every generation of the royal
family would make sure someone carried
on the navy tradition, King George V and
Louis Mountbatten being the most famous and Prince Philip the most recent” would leave Prince Charles and
Prince Andrew wondering where they
fit in. In citing the Falklands campaign,
Herman also mentions what we in Naval Control of Shipping refer to as
“ships taken up from trade.” It is worth
mentioning that without adequate auxiliaries a navy may be at risk and that
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without a controllable merchant marine, a nation may be at risk.
Herman rightly celebrates the daring
and enterprise of British naval officers
and their willingness to use the means
at hand to achieve their goals. A fleet in
being is useless if not backed up by the
commitment to use it. The problem
was, as always, how to pay for the navy,
which Herman cites as the major cause
of Britain’s civil war in 1642. The same
issue faces us in 2005.
PAUL WILLIAM GARBER

Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve, Retired

Stevens, David, ed. The Royal Australian Navy in
World War II. 2d ed. Australia: Allen & Unwin,
2005. 336pp. AUD$39.95

Australia is quintessentially a maritime
nation. From the arrival of Lieutenant
James Cook, RN, in Botany Bay in 1770,
navies have featured heavily in the historical experience of Australia, and for
this naval officer, the navy is rightfully
regarded as “the senior service.” Given
this background, it seems surprising
that there is not more written about
this naval tradition and especially about
the triumphs and tragedies of the Royal
Australian Navy (RAN) in wartime. The
recent publication of a second edition of
David Stevens’s Royal Australian Navy
in World War II fills a very important
gap. First published in 1996, the book
has been augmented significantly in this
new edition.
David Stevens is a former naval officer,
a graduate of the University of New
South Wales and Australian National
University, and currently director of
Strategic and Historical Studies within
the Sea Power Centre–Australia. He

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

153

brings a critical and experienced eye
to his editorship, and this is reflected
in the many changes made in this edition. This book has a new cover, new
photographs, six new chapters, and
substantial updates to all preexisting
chapters, with an increase of over a
hundred pages. This work eschews any
single theme but rather seeks to encapsulate an eclectic array of approaches
to the general topic. While initially
disconcerting, this methodology is
skillfully used and provides a holistic
account of the RAN wartime
experience.
The chapters deal with, inter alia, matters of grand policy concerning Australian naval strategizing in the lead-up to
the war, interesting accounts of battles
experienced by former crew members,
an outline of regional confrontation
with Vichy French representatives, social assessments of the officer corps and
female participation in the naval service, and a description of industrial reorganization within Australia, as well as
accounts of naval operational thinking
and planning during the course of the
war. By any measure, the achievements
of the RAN during the conflict were astonishing. At the war’s close, the RAN
comprised 337 ships and over forty
thousand mobilized personnel. The
navy served in almost every theater of
that global war and earned its fair share
of battle glory. As James Goldrick notes
in chapter 1, the RAN had been involved in the sinking of numerous enemy capital ships and submarines, the
destruction of over a hundred enemy
aircraft and over 150,000 tons of axis
merchant shipping. Perhaps the
RAN’s most significant achievement
was its ability to keep open sea lines
of communication to Australia at a
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time when Japan had conquered vast
swaths of South East Asia and the South
West Pacific.
There are chapters devoted to a number
of distinguished wartime Australian
senior naval officers, and others that
(re)address some of the perennial mysteries, such as the complete loss (and
vanishing) of the cruiser HMAS Sydney
on the eve of the Japanese entry into
the war. The book also devotes a significant amount of attention to the
Australian-U.S. alliance. Indeed, such
concentration is not surprising. World
War II represented a sea change for
Australian security thinking, with
attention diverted away from the
United Kingdom and toward the United
States as the key strategic partner
within the region. Indeed, American
readers will surely find interesting the
accounts in chapter 7 (“The Pacific War:
A Strategic Overview”) and chapter 8
(“Forging an Alliance? The American
Naval Commitment to the South Pacific, 1940–42”) of the Australian-U.S.
military partnership within the Pacific
campaign. Particularly enlightening are
the conclusions drawn of the essential
correctness of prewar U.S. strategic naval thinking and the thorough testing of
naval war plans at the Naval War College. On the other side, I am sure that
American interest will also be piqued by
the chapter by Commodore Loxton (retired), giving his account of postwar
American revisionism concerning the
battle of Savo Island. In this chapter he
notes his attendance as a student at the
Naval War College’s newly founded
Naval Command Course (as the Naval
Command College, today the senior of
the school’s two international programs,
was then known), and in 1959, his participation in a study that emphasized
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U.S. virtue and Australian failings in
that battle. Having been a badly
wounded participant in the battle, he
observes, “My arguments against some
of those hypotheses were therefore
largely based on an innate belief that
we Australians and our Royal Navy
Admiral could not have done as badly
as we were led to believe. At the time I
thought that I had not made much of
an impression, but the following year
Savo was not studied.”
David Stevens has produced a book that
is both highly readable and engaging.
He provides a much needed public face
for the Royal Australian Navy wartime
experience, and he effectively preserves
the legacy of the period. Since the Second World War, the RAN has continued to fight alongside its U.S. Navy
allies in conflicts ranging from Korea
and Vietnam through Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.
For the American reader, this book provides rare insight into the historical
events that formed the genesis of the
modern Royal Australian Navy identity
and thus has allowed an inside understanding of the impulses that continue
to drive it. The RAN is a steadfast and
reliable partner to the USN; gaining this
appreciation of it is reason enough to
read this valuable book.
DALE STEPHENS

Commander, CSM, RAN
Australian Liaison Officer
Naval War College

Ellis, Joseph J. His Excellency: George Washington.
New York: Knopf, 2004. 320pp. $26.95
Fischer, David Hackett. Washington’s Crossing.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004. 564pp. $35
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Wiencek, Henry. An Imperfect God: George Washington, His Slaves and the Creation of America.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.
404pp. $26

Our nation’s first commander in chief,
George Washington, is back in the
news. At Mount Vernon they are striving to recast Washington’s image as
America’s first action hero, while also
sponsoring a high-tech, computerdriven rejuvenation of him to figure out
exactly what he looked like at ages nineteen, forty-five, and fifty-seven. These
current labors, part of an eighty-fivemillion-dollar “To Keep Him First”
campaign, have been bolstered by the
efforts of others. The University of Virginia is in the process of publishing The
Papers of George Washington (fiftytwo of the ninety volumes have been
completed), and the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art recently exhibited thirteen stunning portraits of
Washington by the Rhode Island–born
artist Gilbert Stuart.
A recent outburst of serious and extremely enjoyable books about the man
has reinforced this worthwhile cause.
The three books chosen for this review,
all published within the last two years,
emphasize a particularly important
theme concerning Washington’s incredibly eventful life—the development
of his character and his growth as a
man. One is a full biography, one focuses on the American Revolution, and
the third explores Washington’s attitudes on slavery; they make for a rich
collection of informative reading.
It is generally accepted that Washington
has become ever more remote from the
hearts and minds of his countrymen
and women. To use a prevalent expression, he is perhaps the “deadest, whitest
male in American history.” To paraphrase
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Richard Brookhiser, he is in our textbooks and in our wallets but not in our
hearts. Perhaps these books will at least
help put him back in our minds, if not
in our hearts.
The leadoff selection, His Excellency:
George Washington, is a concise and exceedingly readable biography by Joseph
Ellis, author of the Pulitzer Prize–
winning Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation (Knopf, 2000). Ellis’s
earlier biographies examined the characters of Thomas Jefferson and John
Adams. He once again has chosen to
center his work on the character of his
subject. Ellis has set out to write not
another epic portrait of Washington
but rather a fresh picture focused
tightly on his character and based in
part upon new scholarship on the revolutionary era. Ellis’s goal is to relate
how Washington became who he was.
He gives us this new portrait of Washington’s growth most admirably.
In looking for patterns of emerging behavior, Ellis cites the combination of
Washington’s bottomless ambition and
near obsession with self-control. He also
traces the development of Washington’s
personality, beginning with his experiences as a young man in the wilderness
of the Ohio Valley. The author states
that what in later years would be regarded as aloofness and cold reserve began with Washington’s need as an
inexperienced colonial officer in the
French and Indian War to insulate himself and his reputation from criticism.
To do this, he had to rely on the hard
core of his own merit and self-control,
his strongest assets as a young man on
the way up.
Ellis notes that nothing had a greater
influence on Washington’s rise to distinction than his marriage to the widow
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Martha Dandridge Custis. Her immense dowry launched Washington to
the level of great planters in Virginia’s
Northern Neck region and provided the
foundation for his rise in wealth and
influence.
Ellis is particularly effective in reminding readers that nothing was inevitable
about the success of either the American Revolution or Washington’s role in
it. If Washington had not been able to
learn from his mistakes early in the
war, caused in large part by his naturally aggressive strategy, the conflict
could well have ended in defeat and subjugation for the colonies. Washington
himself wrote, upon initially arriving at
Yorktown, “What may be in the Womb
of Fate is very uncertain.” Nonetheless,
Washington was the centerpiece around
which the Continental Army and the
cause had formed in 1775, and it was
Washington who sustained the army
for nearly eight years of desperate fighting, which enabled the ultimate victory.
Ellis also notes that historians have recently concluded that the American
Revolution occurred simultaneously
with a virulent smallpox epidemic in
the colonies; it claimed about a hundred thousand lives, many of them soldiers. He makes the compelling case
that one of Washington’s most consequential and strategic decisions during
the war was his policy of requiring smallpox inoculation for all troops serving in
the Continental Army.
In what Ellis calls “the greatest exit in
American history,” Washington returned his commission to Congress in
1783. His retirement from power and
return to Mount Vernon have been
noted by other biographers as the
greatest act of Washington’s life. However, the author also argues that
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Washington’s unique character was primarily molded by his experiences during the Revolution. Just as he had
employed a Fabian strategy of avoiding
battles that would have risked the Continental Army’s destruction, he also
“fashioned a kind of Fabian presidency
that sustained the credibility of the federal government by avoiding political
battles that threatened to push federal
sovereignty further and faster than public opinion allowed.”
In the final chapter of this well written
book, Ellis states that there were two distinct creative moments in the founding
of America: the winning of independence and the creation of nationhood.
Washington was the central figure in
both events, and his judgment, in Ellis’s
view, on all major political questions
proved prescient—this “remarkably reliable judgment derived from his elemental understanding of how power
worked in the world.”
Ellis ends his search for how Washington
became the “unquestioned superior” of
all the Founding Fathers by declaring
that Washington “was that rarest of
men: a supremely realistic visionary, a
prudent prophet . . . devoted to getting
the big things right. His genius was his
judgment.”

If the American Revolution was the key
experience in forming Washington’s
personality and character, David
Hackett Fischer’s outstanding book
Washington’s Crossing goes a very long
way to explain why. Fischer, a historian
at Brandeis University and author of
the equally masterful Paul Revere’s Ride
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1994) and Albion’s
Seed (Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), reminds us again that historical events are
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not the products of irresistible forces
outside the influences of human choice.
They are instead the result of “decisions
and actions by people who had opportunities to choose and act otherwise.”
The summer, fall, and winter of 1776
was a time when human choices and actions truly mattered in determining the
fate of the rebelling American colonies.
In the famous words of Thomas Paine,
first published in The American Crisis
on 19 December of that year, they were
“times that try men’s souls.”
The British had landed more than thirtythree thousand crack troops near New
York during the summer and had
driven Washington and the Continental
Army from New York across New Jersey
all the way to the banks of the Delaware
River. They also had seventy warships
lurking off the coast. America had
none. The British had taken Rhode
Island and threatened Philadelphia.
American morale was at a nadir, while
British smugness and confidence were
soaring, and the “glorious cause” hung
by a slender thread. This “cataract of
disaster” was compounded both by the
thousands of Americans who were
signing oaths of loyalty to the crown
and by the hard evidence at roll call that
the Continental Army was shrinking
daily. To reverse this desperate situation seemed almost hopeless, but it
happened; Fischer masterfully relates
not only how but why, and the deeper
implications of it all.
Fischer expertly recounts the even now
unbelievably dramatic facts. On Christmas night of 1776, Washington led a
ragged army of 2,400 colonials across
the ice-choked Delaware River during a
raging storm. After marching all night,
they surprised and defeated a garrison
of 1,500 tough and well-led Hessian
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soldiers at Trenton. These professional
troops were not drunk from celebrating
Christmas but exhausted from standing
vigilant guard and fighting off harassing
militia attacks. Within a few days after
the New Year, the American forces had
thwarted a violent British counterattack
in Trenton, then slipped away overnight to surprise and defeat a British
brigade at Princeton. These victories assuredly revitalized the American cause
and saved the American Revolution.
Fischer greatly enriches the story of
these historic and climactic events. He
argues that after the loss of New York,
Washington changed and adopted a
new strategy that became an element of
the new American way of war. This
strategy was in part Fabian, as noted by
Joseph Ellis—that is, to avoid a risky
general action but strike only when a
“brilliant stroke could be made with . . .
probability of success.” Washington
also adapted and learned to use artillery, initiative, speed, and intelligence
as force multipliers, and he evolved an
adaptive system of counsel and command that contrasted markedly with
the rigidity of control in the British
military.
The new way of war also included much
more. It embodied Washington’s belief
in what John Adams called a “policy of
humanity,” extending quarter in battle
and insisting on the decent treatment of
prisoners, which aligned the conduct of
the war with the values of the Revolution. These values were further extended
by Washington’s strict prohibitions
against the pillaging of civilian property
and by his insistence on deference to
his civilian superiors in Congress.
Fischer also comments on the unabashedly heroic painting Washington Crossing the Delaware, by Emanuel Leutze.
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He reminds us that the magnificent
(twenty by twelve feet) canvas that now
hangs in New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art is highly symbolic. Completed
in 1851, the painting was intended to
inspire the mid-nineteenth-century European revolutionaries and depict the
crucial importance of Washington’s
ability to unite the diverse Americans
pictured in the boat to pull together in
the common cause of freedom.
Fischer concludes his superlative book
in the same manner Leutze conceived
his painting—with a message for his
contemporaries. He states that the message of Washington’s crossing “tells us
that Americans in an earlier generation
were capable of acting in a higher spirit,
and so are we.” Trenton and Princeton
were brilliant strokes, and Washington’s
Crossing is both a brilliant description
of the events and an illumination of the
man who made them possible.

If Americans in an earlier generation
were capable of acting in a higher spirit,
there is a reasoned argument to be
made that George Washington himself
did so particularly in the fourth paragraph of his last will and testament. After the brief first sections of the will,
where Washington declared himself a
citizen of the United States, settled his
few debts, and provided for his wife,
Martha, he began the fourth paragraph
with the following extraordinary sentence: “Upon the decease of my wife, it
is my Will & desire that all the Slaves
which I hold in my own right, shall receive their freedom.”
The story tracing Washington’s tortured
journey to personal awareness and moral
change concerning slavery, and ultimately to the act of emancipation, is
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superbly told by Henry Wiencek in his revisionist work An Imperfect God: George
Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation
of America. Wiencek, winner of a National Book Critics Circle Award for his
earlier book The Hairstons: An American
Family in Black and White (St. Martin’s,
1999), sees the Revolution as the primary
experience that motivated Washington’s
reflection and ultimate change on slavery.
Wiencek does not see Washington’s freeing of his slaves as a parting act of grace
or as a sign of his natural benevolence but
as a testament to a “profound moral
struggle,” one that represented a “repudiation of a lifetime of mastery.”
Tracing Washington’s path to repudiation of slavery is a difficult task, necessarily filled with subtleties of interpretation.
As one historian has said of Washington,
“no more elusive personality exists in
history.” Nonetheless, Imperfect God aptly
reinforces what Joseph Ellis notes, that
the Revolution transformed almost everything, both for the country and for
Washington.
Washington initially came to own
slaves through inheritance from his father (at age eleven) and then from his
half-brother Lawrence. Although he
used his slaves and his wife’s dower
slaves to work the five joining farms of
Mount Vernon his entire life, there are
clues that Washington’s long transformation concerning slavery began at
least as early as 1769. Wiencek emphasizes that Washington took part in a
slave lottery in Williamsburg that year
and witnessed a slave auction “consisting chiefly of boys and girls, from 14 or
15 down to the ages of two or three
years.” Wiencek believes that this auction and similar experiences caused
Washington to reflect on the monstrous
cruelty of breaking apart families, so
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that by the mid-1770s he had offered to
buy an entire family he did not need
rather than separate its members. In
1786, Washington wrote that he never
wanted to purchase another slave unless
there were most unusual circumstances,
referring to “that species of property
which I have no inclination to possess.”
Yet it was as commander in chief in
Boston in 1775 that Washington really
began to see blacks as human beings
rather than as something to be owned.
He must have been shocked on arriving
in Massachusetts to see large numbers
of black men bearing arms. He was introduced to a black hero of Bunker Hill,
and the black poet Phillis Wheatley
wrote a poem in his honor. In response
to Wheatley’s poem and her accompanying letter, Washington invited her to
his headquarters in Cambridge. He was
changing his view of blacks, and the
greatest impact of this change was in
the Continental Army. His general orders issued 30 December 1775 stated:
“As the General is informed, that Numbers of Free Negroes are desirous of enlisting, he gives leave to recruiting
Officers, to entertain them, and promises to lay the matter before the Congress.” This was a new policy, and
according to Wiencek, “Washington
won the Revolutionary War with an
army that was more integrated than any
military force until the Vietnam War.”
Wiencek further traces Washington’s
change in attitude after the war. With
the encouragement of the Marquis de
Lafayette, Washington, before he became president, had deeply reconsidered the implications of slavery. In
1786, he wrote that he hoped the Virginia legislature would abolish slavery
“by slow, sure, & imperceptible degrees.”
Wiencek believes there is evidence that
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by 1789 Washington had experienced a
moral epiphany, as he outlined a plan in
secret to sell his western lands to finance
gradual emancipation of his slaves. In
1794, Washington wrote to a relative, “I
am principled against selling negroes, as
you would do cattle in a market,” and he
later stated to a friend that the “unfortunate condition” of his slaves “has been
the only unavoidable subject of regret.”
In the end, he did what no other slaveowning Founding Father did. He freed
the 123 slaves he had legal control over
at Martha’s death and provided from
his estate for the care and basic education of those who most needed it for
the next thirty-three years. All this was
done despite his wife’s (and his extended family’s) embittered opposition.
He realized that this act made him a
stranger in his own land. He had once
remarked to Edmund Randolph that if
slavery continued to divide America,
“he had made up his mind to move and
be of the northern.”
Wiencek’s book gives a balanced view
of his subject. He is careful to place
Washington in the context of his times,
neither apologizing for nor condemning him. He does not avoid the fact that
Washington owned, worked, punished,
bought, and sold slaves. Yet the sum of
Washington’s stature as a founder is
not diminished by Wiencek’s portrait
but rather better brought to light.
In sum, these three excellent books help
to reveal Washington as a man in full
who had the self-awareness, the will,
and the moral courage to change. He
saw life steadily, and he tried to see it
whole. There is still a great deal to admire and to learn from his personal
journey as a human being.
WILLIAM M. CALHOUN

Naval War College
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